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Honorable William E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Bill:

As you know, the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC) was established by the November 5, 1971, memorandum to be an integral part of the revised procedures designed to strengthen the role of the DCI as the leader of the intelligence community and to provide the DCI with the means of carrying out the responsibilities assigned by the National Security Act of 1947 and by the President. I believe that we all can agree on a set of principles which should govern the operation of IRAC to assist you in this role.

- IRAC should serve you as DCI in your role as intelligence resource advisor to the President.
- It should address major resource issues, including the value of the end product in relationship to the cost.
- It should provide you with advice on these issues.
- It should not be a decision forum, but should provide for the expression of conflicting views for your consideration.

In summary, IRAC should operate to ensure that important resource issues are identified, that appropriate staff work is done so that the major programmatic considerations are surfaced, and that conflicting views are cogently and coherently set forth. I am sure that you will agree that in the past the IRAC has not done this.

The starting point, it seems to me, should be the identification of the major issues for your consideration before IRAC. Your staff prepared an excellent list in early May; additional ones were specified at the June 30 IRAC. The IRAC Working Group should be able to compile a list of candidate issues prior to our July 29 meeting. IRAC itself seems to be the appropriate forum for the examination of cross-program issues and problems that cannot be dealt with by a single program manager. In these cases, where the involvement of and inputs from several managers are required, you could directly task the IRAC Working Group to recommend terms of reference, deadlines, and project teams to examine these issues. Since the issues would be examined on an ad hoc basis by the best qualified personnel available, this procedure would not require the creation of standing subcommittees. For issues confined to a single program, you could directly task the program managers for inputs with progress monitored by the IRAC Working Group to see that your needs and the demands of the budget timetable are met. As I noted at the last meeting, your tentative recommendations on the major issues would be most useful if available in October.

Standing subcommittees, other than the Working Group, should, it seems to me, be reserved for long-range continuing problem areas. In this regard, the Research and Development Council of IRAC has been particularly successful in providing an interface for R&D activities within the intelligence programs and with those intelligence-related R&D activities outside these programs. A similar council would be useful in providing the interface between national and tactical intelligence.

I believe that strengthening the effectiveness of IRAC will be helpful in meeting the objectives reiterated by President Ford in his October 9, 1974, letter to you.

Sincerely,



Donald G. Ogilvie
Associate Director

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